Guns and Nuance Prod Iraqi Political Process
Of the many messages, the first was most bold: Neither Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari nor his cabinet with Shiite ties were told in advance of this raid. The word to Mr. Jaafari, whose political loyalties lie with firebrand Cleric Moktada al-Sadr, is two pronged. The United States will act to clean up sectarian violence if the Iraqi Government doesn’t, and the Iraqi Army is more loyal to the United States than it is to the Jaafari Government.
As Shiite politicians expressed outrage over the “Mosque” raid, calling the meetings there apolitical , the Bush administration was busy sending messages of its own to the Shiites. Rumors abounded last weekend that President Bush declared Jaafari had to go as Prime Minister. Though the White House later denied Mr. Bush had taken a stand on this matter, this backdoor message sent on the heels of the “Mosque” raid shook Shiite politics to the core.
While the United States is blamed for meddling in Iraqi politics, it is the Kurds, Sunnis and Secular Shiites who reject Jaafari for Prime Minister. These groups of elected legislators form 140 of 275 members of the new Parliament--a majority. No negotiations on a Unity Government are possible with a Prime Minister chosen and supported by al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army. A fact central to democracy in Iraq is the United States did not expend blood and treasure in Iraq for a thirty year old man like al-Sadr to become a political king maker with only thirty seats in Parliament backing him.
In a rare instance, Ayatollah Sistani made a political statement through an aide by leaving a letter from Mr. Bush un-translated and unread. The message is said to thank the Ayatollah for urging calm when the Askariya Mosque in Samara was blown up. The other more important message is said to be Mr. Bush’s preference for anyone but Jaafari for Prime Minister. Sistiani’s aide lashed out at American interference in Shiite politics as the pretext for the Ayatollah not acknowledging the letter. Yet the Ayatollah had a meeting with al-Sadr later in the week . No comments were released after this gathering of religious leaders.
Negotiations will continue on the Shiite side to either break the deadlock or continue it. One thing is for certain: The Coalition has demonstrated it will do whatever is necessary with the Iraqi Army to ensure the investment in blood and treasure is not lost over a political deadlock held up by one firebrand cleric.
On the immediate upside, Jill Carroll was freed on Thursday after three months of what she characterized as “falling off a cliff.” Upon her release, she was dropped with a Sunni political group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, where she was interviewed for Iraqi television. The Iraqi Army raid freed a bound and tortured hostage thought to be Sunni. One can assume Carroll’s release is quid-pro-quo, as is the case in relations between the United States and Sunnis. The U.S. gained some needed credibility on the Sunni Street from this operation.
Evidence points to a unified political and military strategy by the United States in efforts to jump start a stalled process. The intricate tapestry of last week’s two prong assault on al-Sadr’s political underpinnings, including ignoring the present government in a military decision, could only be approved by the National Security Council with ultimate approval by President Bush. This move to dislodge the political process is as bold and nuanced as any strategy yet seen in Iraq. Much hinges on its success.
With United States troop withdrawals possibly to begin this summer, a great deal hinges on the benchmark of a Unity Government capable of governing Iraq. The Iraqi Army is well on its way to be the fighting and unifying force necessary to take on the Insurgency with continued logistical support for some time to come. As U.S. casualties drop to the lowest levels in months, the interlocking puzzle pieces of success in Iraq are coming into focus, although sometimes it takes a file to the to make the pieces fit. While Shiite politicians deride US interference, Iraqi leaders surely must understand the disorder in Iraq affects political life in Washington as well.
